Interrogating the Zimbabwe Question Post July 2013 Electoral Outcome

Abstract:

This research paper looks at the global political developments behind the outcome of the 31st July 2013 Harmonised Elections in Zimbabwe and the subsequent strides towards the legitimation of the Mugabe Regime by the international community supported by the Africa Union (AU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The research draws upon the work by Robinson and Gallagher (1953) applying their theory on Imperialism of Free Trade to account for the ‘abandoning’ of the Zimbabwe Question ahead of the 2013 harmonised elections with a preference on dealing with the Arab Spring in the MENA region. The paper employs mostly published empirical historical researches and international relations theories – namely neo-liberalism and Morgenthau’s Political Realism in Politics Among Nations (1948) to substantiate its claims. Most prior researches on the electoral outcome of July 31st 2013 tend to focus on intra-national developments in Zimbabwe, that is, how ZANU PF managed to amass the support of the electorate to outwit the opposition and win the election at the level of method. These focuses undermine and tend to limit the freeness and fairness of an election to a non-violent environment relegating international players to ‘spectators.’ This paper demonstrates how the opposition parties and their allies lost the election at the level of global politics.

 Introduction:

Narratives around the July 31st 2013 elections have been conjectural (based primarily on surmise rather than adequate evidence) with conflicting theorems and hypotheses being developed in the streets, academic circles and corridors of power on how the ruling ZANU PF won the elections. While acknowledging that no mono-causal explanation taken by itself can best explain the occurrence of July 31st 2013, this paper argues that the Zimbabwe Question was defeated at the level of global politics. That the failure of the opposition parties and their allies to read international trends against a seemingly ‘tired’ agenda resulted and buttressed the ‘31st July shock.’ The paper uses empirical historical researches and international relations theories – namely neo-liberalism and realpolitik to substantiate its claims. In its findings the paper also offers alternative advocacy initiatives and movement (re)building hindsight for civics and social movements. The treatise is structured in 5 sections the first offering an understanding of key terms and context, the second section problematises the Zimbabwe question locating it in the contextual analyses while the third section offers a scenario matrix. The fourth section looks at shifts in global [neoliberal] politics and opposition politics in development countries giving succinct and rooted empirical developments and the fifth and final section is a conclusion that draws a balance sheet on the discussions and yet is compelled to pose questions on the future of the democratisation agenda.

The post July 2013 electoral outcome has had numerous interpretations with an attempt at unpacking the context and what could have possibly led to the result of the last election. Most narratives and analyses tend to look at the intra-national developments and how ZANU PF outwitted the main opposition party MDC (T) and on a smaller scale the MDC, Mavambo, ZAPU and others. While acknowledging the various electoral mal-practises that culminated in the result of July 31 and the scholarly researches such as the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute Report, How Can the 2013 Harmonised Elections Results be Explained? (2013) by both civic society and the academia, the main hypothetical progression of this paper is to present an analysis rooted in international relations (global politics and economy) accounting for both the result and the subsequent responses from the international community, that the MDC (T) had no adequate understanding of global developments whose ramifications worked against its electoral strategy is an indispensable FACT. The treatise offers a paradigm shift from what have become civic society and opposition normative discourses (idealisms on processes and outcomes) arguing that the realist perception stood the day on a strategic international prioritisation ladder of Western powers. Morgenthau (1948: p 32) explains Political realism as a theory of political philosophy that attempts to explain, model, and prescribe political relations. It takes as its assumption that power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the domestic arena, the theory asserts that politicians do, or should, strive to maximize their power, whilst on the international stage; nation states are seen as the primary agents that maximize, or ought to maximize, their power. The theory is therefore to be examined as either a prescription of what ought to be the case, that is, nations and politicians ought to pursue power or their own interests, or as a description of the ruling state of affairs-that nations and politicians only pursue (and perhaps only can pursue) power or self-interest. Said crudely; ‘Zimbabwe was not a top notch priority issue for the West in the face of developments in the MENA region’ the same manner that the two Victorians, Robinson and Gallagher (1953) in comparative terms with the rest of Africa saw the strategic importance of Egypt in the late 19th Century in their Imperialism of Free Trade (1953).

International Relations: A Historical Narrative

In order to understand Zimbabwe’s political discourses it is imperative to bear in mind that the state exists within an international system largely shaped by those that control the means of production, (K.Marx, Das Kapital: 1867). In present day existence, neo-liberalism is at the fore following the fall of the Soviet Union and its communist frontiers [largely the end of realism]. Yet the paradox of a state safeguarding its interests outside international governance is formidable and an undeniable fact. It is this desire to safeguard individual national interests that has formed alliances in global frontiers and which this paper argues informed the decision to ‘abandon’ the Zimbabwe question during the last elections. Lessons in yester-centuries still remain relevant in present day interactions of nation states given the dominance and the progression of the international architecture. The US Secretary of State confirmed this position, thus:

Simply put, the money we invest in our foreign policy isn’t just returned to us in the form of security, stability, prosperity, jobs, opportunity, and value in and of itself of backing up our ideals and values with actions; in an increasingly interconnected world, global leadership isn’t a favour we do for other countries, it’s a strategic imperative for the United States of America. All the opportunities we enjoy at home increasingly depend on America’s engagement and investment overseas. [1]

The interpretations on the causality factor of the late 19th Century imperialism provide insights on strategic positioning and alignments in global politics. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Robinson and Gallagher (1953) theory on Imperialism of Free Trade, British imperialism, at least in Egypt, was driven by the need to safeguard the strategic importance (geopolitical locations) of Egypt after crushing the xenophobic Urabi Pasha Revolt and elbowing out France from the gentleman’s agreement of 1859 on investments in a company that would construct a water canal (Suez Canal). Egypt provides a convenient route to the Orients. The United States was to later affirm its influence on Egypt in early 20th Century history following the end of formal occupation and protectorates and an alliance with Britain. That in 2012 events in Tunis sparked changes in governments in Egypt and the MENA region was enough alarm for the reactions at White House and No.12 Downie Street in London and the rest of the European Union (France has at least permanent interests in Tunisia following its occupation of Tunis in 1879,). The West was compelled to rethink its priority areas where it was actively involved in protection and promotion of human rights (though in essence its interests lay in regime changes).

The most logical response by any statesman seeking to safeguard their national interest would be to rethink a less capital and human resource intensive engagement (further compounded by a global financial crisis) and foreign policy and strategy against a priority ladder of ‘spheres of influence.’ This Europe did well at the back of their minds supported by the SADC and AU positions on Zimbabwe despite their public positions which stated that they didn’t believe the election was a true reflection of the will of the people. SADC and the Africa Union maintained that the transitional authority in Zimbabwe had among its deliverables managed to create a conducive environment of a free society as seen with the calm of the 31st July election. The two scenarios that would result from the election were:

  1. An MDC (T) victory would safeguard western interests and would represent a progression of universalism of human rights and the supremacy of democracia though NO direct relationship of the two Universalist values and practises has been established so far. J. Makumbe in Political Scenario Mapping (2011) argued that this scenario was unlikely given that ZANU PF had managed to outwit the MDC (T) by retaining and controlling state institutions and organs that protect state power during the GNU negotiations. The MDC (T) had emerged from the negotiations a junior partner in government. Among the numerous 31 July post mortem narratives Zamchiya (2014) argues that though not exhaustive the MDC (T) may have lost the election at the level of method. Similarly civic society has maintained that both electoral misnomers and the court of public appeal may have also worked against an MDC (T) victory. This paper will not dwell much on these narratives and analyses but argues that there were seemingly numerous developments which are multifaceted and weighed down on Tsvangirai’s electoral success. Be that as it may the West managed to envisage an alternative scenario
  1. A ZANU PF victory – It would be too common knowledge that the West would not be too pleased by a return to power of Robert Mugabe given the sour relations that exist[ed] between Zimbabwe and the Western powers. Mswelanto (2013) notes that western powers have been at the centre of delegitimizing authoritarian regimes that fail to embrace the universality of human rights and curtail democratic development in their states though the gospel of delegitimation is clouded by double standards. Thus:

 It is the failure to adhere to a set of ‘universal’ norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that often leads to the international community applying a set of measures to restrain a regime from further committing human rights violations. Individual western countries and their regional blocs such as the European Union have been at the centre of embarking on de-legitimation of authoritarian regimes though other non western states have also taken the same action such as the position of Kenya towards the Idi Amin administration in Uganda. (2013: p.21)

Mswelanto further notes that one of the issues that have been thorny in the legitimacy question of Zimbabwe have always been around electoral fraud. It is important to first locate electoral processes within the human rights discourse in order to establish and link their relevance to the discussion. Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures

Like any foreign policy architects and practitioners the plan had to be based on this worst case scenario whose likelihood was higher than the ‘ideal.’ That a Mugabe victory was inevitable became common view and an engagement with an administration that the west had previously demonized was compelling – ZANU PF sought legitimacy outside the AU and SADC spaces while Europe sought to regain its economic losses in the face of Chinese competition on Zimbabwe [it is a given that the ZANU PF policy on external relations is based on economic gains for nations that give it legitimacy]

Donor Funding and the Zimbabwe Democratisation Agenda:

“The EU suspended appropriate measures end of July and we now have the opportunity to directly support government. We are now engaging with the government to identify what the priorities are for that which will be significant considering the needs of Zimbabwe.”

 That money is a vehicle for political and electoral participation, no political activity of an electoral magnitude can be successfully undertaken without monetary resources. That being the case, this section critically establishes the misgivings of donor funding in public opinion and lack thereof, sustainable pursuance of democratisation agendas. There are mixed theoretical reactions in establishing need for donor funding and the ultimate crisis of institutionalising social movements that seek a restoration of the justice order in authoritarian states. Resnick (2013: p.4) in Democratic Trajectories in Africa, argues that aid’s impact on democratic consolidation is complex citing the case of Mali which since 1991 has been assisted by large increases in the volume of aid that characterised the post Monterrey period in the last decade. In a similar way external aid has been useful in the emergence and strengthening of a vibrant civic society and social movements. The Mali case resonates with the Zimbabwe case yet the crisis of perception still exists with accusations of social movements and civic society pursuing external agendas. Be that as it may the strategic alliances and partnerships with donor agencies are twofold: at the level of development and a pursuance of a national strategy to political processes. What may be compelling is for movements to manage perceptions at the local level and within the partnerships or they risk being swallowed at the level of method. A dependence syndrome is also worth assessing considering that most of these movements fail to attract community ownership and when funding is withdrawn it is followed by massive cuts in programming, and so does the democratisation agenda suffer regression. The post 31st July epoch requires strategic thought and an understanding of international politics as a measure of survival or rather revival of civics. In a way the opposition is also compelled to rethink its ideals and engagement strategy with the masses and international players lest a continuation of the onslaught on democracy is inevitable at the hands of ZANU PF factions.

Embracing Scenario 2: Forging an Alliance with a ‘Dictator’

As indicated in the initial progression of this argument the West, confronted with the crises in areas of strategic importance, went on to give primacy to the MENA region and sought a re-engagement framework with the post 31st July Zimbabwe government and a year later a series of measures are already underway to readmit Zimbabwe into the International Concert of States, the European Union Parliament Report on the Re-engagement Trip to Zimbabwe (2013) lays bare this position. Thus:

The visit is a part of the overall re-engagement process. The progress made towards the implementation of the Global Political Agreement has allowed the EU to work directly with the Government of National Unity to develop new assistance programmes. The purpose of the visit is to get a better overview and update of the government priorities, needs of the population and existing aid programmes in view of the programming and preparation of the Country Strategy Paper for EU cooperation with Zimbabwe in the framework of the 11th European Development Fund (2014-2020). Special interest lies in food security and agriculture, health and the energy sector. (2013: p.3)

The recent decision by the European Union to expedite the removal of sanctions and channelling of donor funds to the state among other measures speaks volumes to this hypothesis. Civic society and opposition parties find themselves with limited support to carry out their initiatives partly due to the high dependency on external funding that they have developed over the last 15 years or so. It is indispensable that they develop means of sustaining the agenda outside external funding. The growing crisis of governance in Zimbabwe is further compounded by the huge cuts in supporting the democratisation agenda and at minimal represents a policy failure of significant proportions given the dramatic ramifications on the socio-economic front post 31st July 2013 and urgent calls to operationalise democratic institutions and systems provided by the new constitution.

Whither Democracy???

The democratisation agenda seems to have suffered an insurmountable defeat with a regression of at least 15 years yet, given the material conditions obtaining in Zimbabwe, the urgency to rethink and reconnect with the ‘idle’ agenda are still compelling. A number of measures are required to reinvigorate the movement which include but not limited to:

  1. Seeing the bigger picture – Remodelling civic movements within the frameworks of social movements that re-establish the social capital to push agendas for democratisation retaining the people’s ownership to change.
  2. Fighting the temptation of deciding what is good for society – Civic society should embrace the theory ‘agency’ grounded in the religious morality of the times, allowing for the subsequent invention of the individual as a “free agent” able to sustain and make rational choices for (him)self and society (Lukes 1973).
  3. Regional and international advocacy: Who are our allies? How do we engage them? What is their strategic positioning in raising awareness? Who wields influence to change the ‘new’ regional and international perceptions on Zimbabwe? What alternative international strategy can be adopted? Etc
  4. The relationship between social movements/civic society and opposition parties needs clarity. Is civic society pushing agendas of political parties or is it working towards the ideal society? What are the ramifications of divorces and electoral defeats to the democratisation agenda from the ordinary people’s stand point?
  5. Policy Researches and Development – at what stage do we undermine researches in political programming. Do we have adequate understandings of the international system?
  6. What is the relationship that exists between civic society and funding agencies? What does it mean for sustaining a democratisation agenda?

Conclusion

Drawing from the issues raised in this paper, it is indispensable that the greatest misgiving of July 31 was the assumption by the MDCs and their partners that foreign funding and support was going to remain forever not realizing that the EU was swiftly moving towards reengaging with ZANU PF for instance the removal of sanctions and diamond sells at Antwerp. Towards the 2013 harmonised elections the EU was no longer prepared to exert as much pressure on the Harare regime as it did towards 2008. Confronted with developments in the MENA region the West had to safeguard its interests at the expense of other regions that required continuous support to strengthen the democratisation resolve. Within Africa, SADC and AU were prepared to accept any outcome that would remove Zimbabwe from their conference agendas. On the other hand the MDCs were diplomatically weak in that they failed to convince regional and international players that a free and fair election went beyond physical violence. All ZANU PF needed was to hammer the language of peace among its supporters and Nicodemously manipulate the electoral process!

Bibliography

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Mswelanto, T. (2013) De-legitimizing authoritarian regimes: The role of the West in pressuring the Zimbabwe Government to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the wake of human rights violations and economic decline 2001 to 2013, MA Thesis submitted to University of Sussex School of Global Studies

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[1] Except in Statement issued by the Secretary of State, Washington, on Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, March 2014

[2]Acting EU Ambassador to Zimbabwe Carl Skau, Quoted in The Independent Newspaper 07/09/2012

De-legitimizing authoritarian regimes: The role of the West in pressuring the Zimbabwe Government to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the wake of human rights violations and economic decline 2001 to 2013

Summary

The initial investigation of this paper is to determine whether post-colonial statist theory offers an adequate and appropriate assessment of the process of de-legitimation using human rights as a yardstick to measure development. The paper rejects the statist approach as a perennially conservatist assessment, incommensurate with the desire by people to enjoy individual rights and freedoms in dictatorial or authoritarian regimes which fails at an appreciation of the progress that accrues with embracing human rights. It is the paper’s contention that post-colonial statist theory follows an undue consideration of human rights and democratic governance. The research employs an alternative interpretation of de-legitimation using the case of Zimbabwe to read outward from conventional post-colonial statist theory and radical universalism. Subsequently, the paper offers an alternative view that moderates the realms of realpolitik yet embracing the universalism of human rig

Paper Organization

The paper is structured in five chapters with the first premised on the definition of terms exploring the process of de-legitimation as well as constructing what constitutes de-legitimation in international politics.

The second chapter is an interrogation of the theoretical interpretations of de-legitimation using post-colonial statist theory and radical universalism. This chapter features a critical examination of the work by Ranger and Vaughan representing post-colonial statist theory pitted against radical universalism which argues that all humans are equal and universal and that historical and cultural differences cannot be determinants against universalizing human rights. The third chapter is devoted to empiricism featuring Zimbabwe as the main case study while global examples are referred to in general. The fourth chapter is devoted to research findings and prominent arguments that have been featured in debate. This chapter also states an alternative model of analyzing the process of de-legitimation process arguing that the two positions (post-colonial theory and radical universalist interpretation of de-legitimation) are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary development approaches and that the paradox of universalism and realpolitik may be apparent than real.. The last chapter is the conclusion which draws a balance sheet from the theoretical and empirical contestations in the paper reasserting the main research thesis that the process of delegitimizing authoritarian regimes cannot be adequately dismissed as a neoliberal enclave that seeks to perpetuate the economic and political dominance of the developed world over the developing nations and opening up a hive of other possible areas in international relations in relation to human rights and the de-legitimation process such the importance of the year 1948 in international relations and human rights.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter seeks to define the key terms that shape the scope of the research and will concentrate itself to the definition of delegitimation in international politics. Given the absence of a clear definition and limited literature around the concept under study, a derivation from the widely written and discussed legitimation processes will be used to construct a meaning and attach as well as interpret the process of delegitimation.

The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came with the concept of legitimacy of the state as it related to its citizens. Increasingly states that fail to embrace, conform and accord their citizens human rights were seen as illegitimate dictatorship regimes especially with respect to those that ratified and were member states of the United Nations. Nations that are in a transition to democracy are often faced by the challenge of legitimation. Similarly post conflict nations undergo a restructuring of internal institutions and develop them to be in sync with internationally accepted standards (which standards are can be equated to a comprehensive Bill of Rights that is in sync with the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the observance of the rule of law). Papagianni (2008: p.49) offered a limited definition of legitimacy referring to it ‘as the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.’ However, Frank quoted in Papagianni (p.49) offers a convincing explanation to what state legitimacy entails and describes it as when rules are upheld and there is collectivization of decision making from both the governed and government.  This definition of legitimacy can be said to be in tandem with democracy. Though convincing the definition also fails to capture international perception on particular regimes’ interaction with their citizens.  Wilson (2001: p.17) notes that legitimation often entails the legitimacy of the justice delivery system and constitutionalism to ‘acceptable’ international norms. Wilson p. 18 notes that the challenge of legitimation cannot be confined to adherence with the rule of law especially in respect of nations that have authoritarian laws and constitutions. While there are numerous scholarly articles written on the process of legitimation there is limited literature on what de-legitimation entails in international politics.

Having explored the debate around legitimation as a practice in international politics, it is important to use the definitions and scope above to construct a definition of delegitimation in international politics. Delegitimation can be summarized as an act of revoking the legal status of a regime thus making it invalid, illegal and unacceptable in this particular research the yardstick of measure is adherence to human rights. It is the failure to adhere to a set of ‘universal’ norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that often leads to the international community applying a set of measures to restrain a regime from further committing human rights violations. Individual western countries and their regional blocs such as the European Union have been at the centre of embarking on delegitimation of authoritarian regimes though other non western states have also taken the same action such as the position of Kenya towards the Idi Amin administration in Uganda. The UK Government website explains that the EU arrives at delegitimation following a Common Position by member states on a particular case. On the same note Botswana has taken measures to delegitimize the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. Doxey   1996: p.1 notes that the United Nations  though its Security Council has also carried out a number of delegitimation actions on regimes such as the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia from 1966 to 1979 (now Zimbabwe) and the apartheid regime in South Africa, Iraq, Libya, Angola and Liberia among others.

The process of delegitimation often entails but is not limited to the application of sanctions on authoritarian regime members and their commercial enterprises, travel restrictions, military support for opposition movements, military interventions, no fly zones as well as broad based sanctions targeted at the nation in question. The UK Government website explains one aspect of delegitimation in the form of sanctions thus; ‘Sanctions and embargoes are political trade restrictions put in place against target countries with the aim of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.’ The European Union website further explains its position regarding governments that violate human rights noting that to influence policies violating international law or human rights, or policies disrespectful of the rule of law or democratic principles, the EU has designed sanctions of a diplomatic or economic nature.

The legal route can also be taken in delegitimizing regimes that violate international norms and conventions, this may involve an indictment on a seating president as is the case with the President of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir who is accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as reported on the International Criminal Court website Case ICC-02/05-01/09. Two pre-trial warrants of arrest have been issued and member states are expected to ‘arrest’ him whenever he visits a host country and hand him over to the International Criminal Court for trial. Other heads of states that have been indicted at the International Criminal Court include Libya’s former leader Muammar Gaddafi and Cote d Ivorie’s Laurent Gbagbo. For the purposes of this research this paper will not look at the effectiveness of the legal route.

As a process, and in theory, delegitimation isolates a regime with a view of restraining further violations though post colonial theory accuses the process of being driven by an ‘artificial’ regime change agenda. The debate shall be explored into greater depth in the following chapters.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Chapter 2

The preceding chapter has developed a definition of delegitimation and what it entails also giving examples of the different tools employed by the both individual states and international community. This chapter is devoted to the theoretical frameworks that have shaped debates in interpreting foreign intervention, also applicable with delegitimation, in cases of human rights abuses.

Theoretical Framework

The basis of refutation of the orthodox radical post-colonial statist interpretation of de-legitimation is its incompatibility with an ever changing citizenry that is demanding to enjoy the fruits of majority rule and human rights previously suppressed in colonial epoch. The research is located within post-colonial theory but chooses to take a liberal view by challenging radical notions in cultural relativism and realism and on the same page questioning radical universalism.

Broadly, this paper is a contestation rooted in two theoretical frameworks, that is, the place of human rights in international society and political realism and cultural relativism ‘which challenge the idea of international human rights policies.’ In particular a contestation of the cosmopolitan model is preferred in the succeeding arguments which Donnelly (1998: p.28) describes as focusing on the idea that the individual comes before the state. Implied is that individual rights are seen as sacrosanct and state power and sovereignty is lessened in respect to human rights.

The model represents the universality of human rights and can be said to be the basis for de-legitimation in the case of violations giving the international community both moral and jurisprudential obligation to  intervene in states that are deemed to be denying their citizens human rights. This model is largely criticized within post-colonial theory as a means by which the West continues to exercise neo-liberal tendencies over the South. There is, therefore, a need to create a contestation with the traditional statist model which (Donelly 1998: p.28) sums up as the idea that the human rights cannot and should not be a universalized sphere and the international community has no obligation to act on behalf of human rights in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

P. Ahluwalia, (2001: p.86) wrote extensively analyzing the universality of human rights in Africa, noting that while human rights are a liberal doctrine their universality is now appreciated. He correctly notes that post colonial Africa is subjected to a lot of scrutiny by the international community using the Development Project organizations. Thomas quoted in Ahluwalia p.86 notes that ‘there is little doubt that the human rights record in sub Saharan Africa has been pathetic. This is particularly true looking at both the records of abuses as well as trials brought before the ICC. The nature of these cases, all include crimes against humanity and genocide.

Jack Donnelly (1990:35) quoted in Ahluwalia p.87 correctly sums up human rights as ‘irreducible moral value in each individual.’ Ahluwalia notes that human rights emphasize the individual rather than the community, and it is this emphasis that is a Western concept which is not in sync with the ‘African communitarian belief and values’ and  that erodes state power. The distinction is then made between what can be considered as African human rights and the western or liberal notion of human rights. Ahluwalia notes that the difference is largely traceable on epistemology with human rights attributed to the 18th century philosophy in the west yet for Africa it is a concept that places the community at the epicenter. Implied in this distinction is that the African notion is closely knitted with the realist thought of the supremacy of the state over individual rights. Rhoda Howard quoted in Ahluwalia explicitly explains it as ‘the group is more important than the individual.’ The challenge of human rights is also seen as in contradiction with the demands of development as ‘development would require an interventionist state.’ Donnelly (2003: p.90) explores the radical positions between cultural relativism and radical universalism and attempts to differentiate them according to the extent to which they can be fundamentalist.

While this analysis is intriguing and offers sound benchmarks to a preliminary understanding of contestations in the discipline of human rights in international relations, the analysis omits an important aspect that this paper argues, that humans by nature have an intrinsic desire to enjoy freedoms regardless of geo-political locations and cultural historiographies. While it is true that different cultures and nations have a different notion on how the concept of human rights should be applied, the history of peoples (either  in the West or post-colonial states) has been dominated by struggles to be free either as a collective or individuals, Douzinas (2000: p.70) traces the development of intellectual thought around the concept of human rights and notes that it was Hobbes treatise titled Leviathan that can be credited with introducing a disjuncture in political thought to a human rights approach. Douzinas p. 371 goes on to make a bold pronouncement, in a chapter titled The End of Human Rights, of the end of the discourse on human right which is replaced by humanism. Interesting to note is that this is a normative framework obviously envisaging a new political order in which human rights will be a non issue in international relations in a political order that has surpassed their development and are fully embraced. What is of importance though is the omission of the challenge from post-colonialism which still seems to grow in strength in their challenge of the discourse, a position that poses challenges to the realization of Douzinas’ normative thoughts.

Donnelly’s analysis also fails to grasp the recent trend in post-colonialism that advocates for economic emancipation at the expense of political freedoms exemplified by a common statement in the developing world that ‘we don’t eat human rights.’ Though this is a generalized view the eminence of it is that it challenges the West on whether they should be pressing for governments in developing nations to foster political freedoms or the West needs to tackle the burning question of loosening their grip and control of developing nations’ economies. This paper argues that the point of contestations or conflict between the West and the developing nations in general and Zimbabwe in particular has also been a case of the West calling for accountable governments that accord their citizens the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of democracy particularly in dictatorships while these calls are often dismissed as illegitimate given the historical colonial injustices and continued dominance of neo-liberalism in post colonial states. This, as shall be shown in the succeeding chapter, sums up the debate between the Mugabe regime and the West. Yet either economic freedom or political freedoms should not be used as a pretext to deny the other set of freedoms but when applied in wholesome human rights both political and socio-economic rights can be sufficient drivers for sustainable national and global development.

It is from these theoretical contestations that the next chapter will be devoted to test using an empirical study of Zimbabwe’s foreign relations with the West and analyze official government positions that cite neoliberalism at the core of severed relations as well as economic downturn.

Chapter 3

The preceding chapter has interrogated the theoretical foundations that shape an understanding of delegitimation represented by two seemingly diametrically opposed positions in post colonial theory and radical universalism. In this chapter using the Case Study of Zimbabwe, the paper employs empiricism to put to test the two positions to contest each other while laying the basis or foundation for new conclusions and approaches in interpreting the process of delegitimation inter alia the discourse on human rights in international relations. This chapter, therefore, directly looks at the Zimbabwe case with an indebt analysis meant at unearthing the reason behind the delegitimation of the Mugabe regime by the West using inter alia post colonial theory as proposed by T.O. Ranger et al. The chapter confines its research to the period between 2001 and 2013 though references are made to preceding years drawing a disjuncture in foreign policy engagements and relations. Relevant global examples also feature prominently in the discussion.

3.1 Post-Colonialism vs. Neo-liberalism: The Case of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a former British colony which gained independence on 18 April 1980 following years of both diplomatic engagements and a protracted liberation war. In the initial years of independence the country experienced genocide also known as the Gukurahundi, that according to the Genocide Watch website (07/07/2012) claimed over 20 000 lives in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced a rapid downturn from the late 1990s to present day. Two opposing explanations have been given for the economic misfortunes with the official government position being the result of ‘illegal western sanctions targeted at effecting regime change’ while the other position argues that the economic failure emanates from bad governance, human rights abuses as well as corruption.

The country has been isolated from the international community following a record of human rights violations cited from the year 2000 when the government engaged in forced seizures of white owned commercial land which also coincided with the formation in 1999 of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which was to be the dominant opposition political party in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime has been accused of instigating violence against political opponents, its citizens and social movements calling for political reforms. Numerous cases of violations are cited in this chapter. In post 2005 elections the government embarked on an operation targeted at ‘cleaning the cities’ titled Operation Murambatsvina which saw the violent displacements of over half a million people. The opposition accused the government of targeted persecution of the urbanites given that they had voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. The Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe led by Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka 2005 p.32-33 shows that an estimated 650 000 to 700 000 people where directly affected by the Mugabe regime’s purge on urbanites who are considered as supporters of the opposition party MDC while over 2.1 million citizens were indirectly affected. This case is just but one of the numerous cases cited in this paper that represents gross human rights violations through violence, internal displacements, torture, and forced exiles. In this case the Mugabe regime is accused of having flouted Article 25 (1) which guarantees the right to shelter or housing.

European nations and their regional bodies imposed sanctions (travel restrictions on the government officials to western countries except on UN business, economic sanctions on commercial enterprises linked to the regime’s members, withdrawal of diplomatic missions, suspension from the Commonwealth, US Senate crafted ZIDERA among other conditions) as an attempt to restrain the government from further engaging in gross human rights abuses and foster democratic governance and observance of human rights. The government of Zimbabwe alleges that the actions by the West are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. They interpret the West as exercising its neo-liberal tendencies meant to reverse the ‘gains of the liberation struggle’ by supporting a status quo where the means of production is owned by minority whites.

The Insider quoted Zimbabwe’s Information Minister Jonathan Moyo as having dismissed the de-legitimation efforts on the Zimbabwean Government by the United States Senate through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act passed in 2001 as a racist piece of legislation. He is thus quoted as having said ‘America is not the policeman of the world and should leave Zimbabwe to determine its destiny.’ Inherent in this statement is that it rendered questionable the legitimacy of the de-legitimation efforts by the USA as well as a reminder of the realist perception of the international system and that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and therefore the state and its constitution supersedes any international entity or organization.  This statement gives insights to the thinking within post-colonial theory which reaffirms its commitment to non-interference by external forces in the internal affairs of states especially with regards to the way the West treats the developing nations. The argument is rooted in the history of the relations between the North and the South dating back to the eras of mercantilism, slave trade and colonialism which were exploitative to the African and tilted in favor of the West. In the same article Moyo is quoted thus;

The people don’t understand how a government that allows a genocide in Rwanda now wants to poke its nose into the affairs of Zimbabwe. The people don’t understand how a government that is playing ping pong while Palestinians are being gunned down by the brutality of Israel wants to get involved in Zimbabwean matters. More importantly, the people don’t understand how a country that does not want to apologize for slavery in Africa, a country that does not want to compensate Africa for colonialism, yet assisting Israel to get compensation, can poke its nose on the affairs of Zimbabwe.

In a similar argument President Mugabe also dismissed the sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain and European Union as illegitimate. The Age quotes President Mugabe at the United Nations Food Summit in 2008 alleging that United States President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared to have taken on the mantle of “Almighty God,” deciding who should rule and where. He further explained that they (USA and Britain) had created “a world of giants and international terrorists who use now their state muscle in order to intimidate us, (in which) we become the midgets.” While these remarks certainly confirm post-colonial theory fears on the neo-liberal tendencies by the West, it is equally important to look at the Zimbabwean case bearing in mind the human rights violations that characterize the political landscape in order to have an in depth understanding of the de-legitimation of the Mugabe regime. In a report compiled by the Human Rights Watch (2002: p.18) at least 829 cases of violence associated with the fast track land reform programme had been reported to the Commercial Farmers Union. This violence was directly associated with the Fast Track Land Reform exercise carried out by the Zimbabwe Government at the beginning of 2000. The idea behind the fast track land reform was to correct colonial land ownership imbalances to which, according to Chitsike 2003: p.7 about 15.5million hectares of the land was owned by 4000 commercial white farmers constituting 49 percent of the land in a population of 12.5million. However this paper is cognizant of the political motivation behind the fast track land reform programme in the face of dwindling support for the Mugabe administration which had also coincided with the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change in September 1999 as well as economic downturn which had seen agitated masses (mainly labour) engaging in food riots at the end of 1998.

Writing for the Open Society Initiative, O. Tungwarara 2009: p.110 briefly analyses the impetus behind the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe by aptly noting that the EU’s 2002 decision to suspend budgetary support to the Zimbabwean government was made under article 96 of the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU signed in Cotonou in 2000. Article 9 of the Agreement provides for good – transparent and accountable – governance as a fundamental element of cooperation. If problems develop, article 96 provides for consultation between the parties in order to agree on measures to improve the governance conditions in the ACP country concerned. But if the consultations are unsuccessful, article 96 does allow for sanctions.

Indeed, article 96 sanctions have been imposed on a host of other ACP countries. Therefore, it is not correct to say that this aspect of the EU sanctions was motivated by an imperialist and regime change agenda that specifically targeted Zimbabwe. That the Zimbabwe Government violated the provisions of a multilateral treaty that it was party to through human rights violations cannot justifiably exonerate itself by applying statist postcolonial theory alleging the EU violated international law by intervention in the internal affairs of another state. In the same vein a shred of analysis is necessary on Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth in 2002 and its subsequent decision to withdraw from the grouping in 2003. The Commonwealth has a set of political values and its overall mission is to foster democratic development in member states. The Commonwealth website explains that the political values were developed by member states heads of governments at their ‘biennial meetings (known as CHOGMS) in 1971 in Singapore and reaffirmed in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1991. That Zimbabwe’s political leadership voluntarily joined the Commonwealth and consciously violated the same code of conduct it took part in creating, ratified and hosted in 1991 is worth exploring. The Harare Declaration of 1991 had changed the focus of the Commonwealth from a non-interventionist approach to a ‘globalized’ agenda of fostering democratic development, human rights, good governance and the rule of law. What is ironic is that at its withdrawal from the grouping in 2003 Zimbabwe’s Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Mumbengegwi had cited that the actions of the grouping were tantamount to interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

Similarly, the Islands of Fiji were suspended from the same body in 2003. It is against this background that dismissing efforts at fostering democratic processes by simplifying them as driven by a host of neo-liberal agendas becomes unconvincing. The argument by ZANU PF that the de-legitimation drive by the West is underpinned by a regime change policy in which the United States and its allies (Britain, Commonwealth, EU and the United Nations) seek to impose a stooge or puppet government that will save their neo-liberal interests in controlling the means of production and ownership of land in Zimbabwe, degenerates in the first instance.

It is important to note that the response by the West to de-legitimize the Zimbabwe Government through US targeted sanctions in 2001, the United Nations Arms Embargo on Zimbabwe, the European Union Sanctions of February 2002 and the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth had equally been triggered by the violence that took place against both commercial white farmers and their Black African employees. The British Government website summarizes the reasons for the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe as emanating from the suppression of human rights, freedom of expression and absence of good governance. The official position is that the sanctions imposed on the Government of Zimbabwe will not be lifted until there is ‘progress’ on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The rationale therefore of the sanctions was that they would alter the unacceptable behavior of the government and those that presided over abuses.

3.2 Zimbabwe Elections and De-legitimation

One of the issues that have been thorny in the legitimacy question of Zimbabwe has always been around electoral fraud. It is important to first locate electoral processes within the human rights discourse in order to establish and link their relevance to the discussion. Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures

It is this article that has been used to delegitimize the Mugabe regime as an illegitimate and dictatorship regime on allegations of continuously flouting the people’s aspirations by rigging elections, use of coercive force as well as rampant violence on opposition parties. The West has maintained this position on the Mugabe regime since the year 2000.

The Genocide Watch provides a narrative of legislative developments that took place in Zimbabwe prior to the elections of 2002, these were largely measures put in place by the Mugabe regime to curtail freedoms targeted at political activity. In preparation for the 2002 presidential election, draconian laws were enacted by ZANU-PF, which made it virtually impossible for the opposition (MDC) to compete or campaign. An example was the “Public Order Security Act” (POSA), which gave the police power to arrest or use ‘minimum force’ on any public gatherings not sanctioned by the police themselves. Given the fact that Zimbabwe’s police force has been accused of its allegiance to the ruling party as a result of the absence of the principle of separation of powers, this stopped free opposition political activity. Another law enacted in 2002 was the “Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act” (AIPPA) which dictated the limits within which all forms of media could operate. This meant all material that did not sympathize with the ZANU-PF agenda was banned, effectively preventing the MDC from campaigning in state owned newspapers, television station or radio. These laws were enforced with a single purpose in mind, to consolidate the power of ZANU-PF and eliminate any possible threats to its dominance. In the same vein the Mugabe regime recruited and trained youth militias who have been accused of terrorising the electorate together with former liberation war ex-combatants. The two sets of laws are in contravention of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and have been cited as the legislative bench marks for violations of Human Rights.
 The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Report titled The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs 2012: p.9 presented an analysis of pre-electoral violence instigated by the state on citizens towards the run up to the June 27th 2008 elections noting that a total of 3180  cases had been recorded with the perpetrators being the military, police force, Central Intelligence Organisation, ZANU PF militias and War Veteran. All these institutions have a record of saving to preserve the Mugabe Regime by waging acts of violence and intimidation on the electorate..  It is these cases of violations of freedoms of political expression that have been cited by the West as representing violations of international law by the Mugabe regime. In all its deliberations on Zimbabwe the West cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the yardstick to gauge good governance.

Despite obvious differences on how illegitimate regimes should be treated between the West and the Africa Union and other Africa regional blocs there seems to be a level of consensus as the Zimbabwe elections of 27 June 2008 saw the delegitimation no longer confined to the West only but other African member states to the African Union charged that the Mugabe regime had not been elected by the people. At the Africa Union Summit in Addis Ababa Botswana urged the suspension of Zimbabwe from African forums because its participation would “give unqualified legitimacy to a process which cannot be considered legitimate.” The AU reached a consensus that the election as well as the government resonating from the result of the election was illegitimate hence efforts at facilitating a transitional agreement with the opposition parties. The position from the AU was a rather moderate stance compared to the Western stance which was quick to point out the tightening of sanctions while further severing diplomatic relations on the basis that their foreign policies guided by the need for respect of human rights they could not engage with nations or governments that violate the dignity of its subjects or citizens. This reaction by the two different entities is largely shaped by their orientations and can be abstracted to political theory of universalism and relativism which in their outlook exhibit the political nature of human rights.

In a similar development in the aftermath of the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe the West namely USA, Britain and Australia noted that they would not lift sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe as the just ended elections were not a true reflection of the people’s choice. On 3 August 2013 the US government through its Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement of disapproval to the elections of July 31st 2013 noting thus: ‘though the United States was restricted from monitoring these elections, the balance of evidence indicates that today’s announcement was the culmination of a deeply flawed process.’ Similarly other western powers such as Britain and Australia have maintained the same position that the Mugabe regime is illegitimate as its election failed international norms of good governance democracy and acceptable electoral practices. This move maintains the West’s delegitimation stance while the Africa Union endorsed the outcome of the elections. In the face of the international community the Mugabe regime still faces a legitimacy crisis.

In 2003 the United Nations sent its envoy to investigate the increasing reports on  gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe and raised important question targeting how the government was treating opposition members, violent farm invasions as well as the dismissal of white judges from the High Court bench. In a typical post-colonialist response that Ranger embodies in his interpretation of state legitimation the government indicated that the Zimbabwe question was not technical but rather a ‘creation of the West’ meant at undermining the sovereignty of the state by the West which intended to continue its economic domination on weaker states. What requires investigation in this case is the extent to which a government can violate individual or collective rights of it citizens and at the same time blame it on neo-liberalism.

3.3 Rationale of Human Rights in the West: A Policy Issue or Selective Application?

It is erstwhile to unpack whether human rights are a policy issue in the West especially dealing with the European Union and Commonwealth while the same requires analysis when dealing with western individual states (Britain, United States of America and Australia among other) foreign policies. There is enormous debate on whether it is a policy of the West to cut diplomatic ties and impose sanctions on autocratic regimes that violate the rights of their citizens. Clapham 1999: p.627 examines the apparently invisible EU Foreign Policy noting that in 1996 it developed the Common Foreign and Security Policy whose Article J. 1 TEU states the provisions on either engaging or disengaging with international partners based on their human rights records. The provision also gives the same consideration to activities of Multi-National Corporations. Clapham argues that this foreign policy is not clear as it is not in the public domain to access information on whether human rights principles are a major pillar of EU and its institutions’ operation further pointing to the absence of transparency in this discharge of this policy, a position echoed by post colonialist who argue to the double standards of not only the EU but individual Western nations foreign policies.

Having noted the numerous actions taken to delegitimize the Mugabe regime, it is equally important to note that the same regime embarked on a military expedition between 1983 and 1987 that cost over 20000 lives. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in a report of May 1986 showed that there were a series of human rights violations that took place in the initial years of independence waged by either dissidents’ movement or ZANU PF supporters. The New Zimbabwe Forum notes that despite these violations the international community particularly the West remained numb in employing restrictive measures to the government. It is this scenario that also poses doubts on whether it is a policy issue for the European Union to discredit regimes that fail to uphold human rights. If anything Mugabe was to be later knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II in 1994 as Sir Robert Mugabe, Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.

In similar cases the West has been numb and often accused of double standards when dealing with regimes that have had close ties with them, the Syrian case is an example where the West has taken a radical stance on the regime while the same cannot be said of its position on Israel which is accused of using atomic arsenal. as shown in a previous quotation by Zimbabwe’s Minister of information Jonathan Moyo that The people don’t understand how a government that allows a genocide in Rwanda now wants to poke its nose into the affairs of Zimbabwe’ the West often falls short in its application of delegitimation  initiatives. In Egypt the United States was accused of complicity in dealing with the Mubarak regime which was an ally (strategic reasons) yet they were quick in condemning the Kaddafi regime. Similarly the West is accused in its trends of dealing with the previous members of the Communist bloc with accusations of victimizing people from a different ideology; however the accusation does not hold much substance as the Zimbabwe regime was never part of the Communist bloc but maintained cordial relations with its former colonial masters soon after independence in 1980 until its fallout in 2001.

Chapter 4

The preceding chapter has clearly shown the tainted human rights records of the Zimbabwe government. It has also given the narratives of official foreign policy positions from both the West and the Mugabe regime presenting two different interpretations on the universality of human rights and western intervention in Zimbabwe. An attempt has been made to draw examples from across the globe, this chapter will lay out the research findings and develop policy recommendations on how the question of delegitimation can be integrated into mainstream post colonial theory as well international politics. Equally the chapter also proposes a human rights centered development approach that however continues to observe and safeguard state sovereignty.

4.1 Research Findings:

Having explored the Zimbabwe Case as a means to establish the motivation of delegitimation by the West particularly contesting the dogmas of post colonial theory and universal radicalism, the following are some of that can be discerned:

  1. Post colonial theory fails at an appreciation of people’s desires to be free and enjoy fundamental human rights. Internal political processes in which a government denies its citizens fundamental freedoms and rights often manifesting themselves in gross human rights abuses or violations cannot be blamed on external influence. Post colonialism has been found on the idea of cultural relativism with authoritarian regimes arguing that the human rights approach is western and lacks credence when applied to a different setting say in Zimbabwe as argued by the Mugabe regime. Brown 1999: p.103 interjects this argument by offering a more profound and acceptable analysis arguing that though human rights are a liberal notion they only make sense in ‘an ethical community’ and that perhaps it is time that the international system does not concentrate on the notion of universal but emphasis be given to the idea of doing ‘good.’ Authoritarian regimes therefore need to come to terms with an appreciation that intrinsic in humans is an urge and desire to be free and enjoy both political and socio-economic rights, and rather than hiding behind the pretext of external influences and so-called interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states this urge has been at the centre of historical revolutions against authoritarian regimes.
  2. Post colonialism tends to have more emphasis on historical pasts and conveniently ignores present short-comings of authoritarian regimes. The work by T.O. Ranger et al tends to concentrate on cultural relativism and the past short comings of the West particularly the exploitative nature of the North-South Relations tracing it to the era of the slave trade and colonialism. There is an overemphasis on neoliberalism in establishing a locus standi or moral obligation of the West in delegitimizing dictatorships in the South, which emphasis tends to erode the value of embracing human rights. The argument by Brown p.117 would be convincing; that the idea of cultural relativism is a tired debated as it tends to give immunity from criticizing longstanding cultures and traditions that violate basic rights. Brown further observes that the centre of discontent with post colonial theory is on the use of the term ‘universal norms’ but instead proposes that if the use of that term is problematic authoritarian regimes’ evaluations can be best understood using the term ‘good.’ Thus the west may need to revisit their approach in delegitimation actions or approaches p.120 as terms such as wrong and irrational are in appropriate while the term deprived would be more acceptable. While this is a worthwhile approach in dealing with regimes as it eradicates some level of animosity the question still remains whether the world should be economic with the use of words or semantics in delegitimation of regimes that deny their citizens fundamental rights. The value of the delegitimation in this case will be in doubt in as far as the motive is to foster democratic governance.
  3. An orientation towards socio-economic emancipation is not sufficient enough to undermine political rights and equal participation. Political rights and socio-economic rights should be seen as mutually inexplicable coefficients in which one can not sufficient exist in the absence of the other. Human rights consist of three generations however the categorization into three groups does not warrant their separation sufficient in development oriented states. Their division is more apparent than real but each should be seen to complement the other. By undermining the value of political rights post colonial theory slides into the initial western development model in which states emphasized development that saw the exploitation of the masses with a view that at a later stage economic development would usher political freedoms. In this way post colonial theory tends to replicate the foundations of western society that it sought to challenge.  That the west underwent a historical period of exploitation of its citizens is not enough to rid it of propagating a normative discourse of human rights oriented development.
  4. In its attempts to foster an international system with a culture of human rights and democratic governance the West tends to exhibit double standards. This is normally the case when dealing with regimes that have close ties and are viewed as strategic partners such as Egypt yet when dealing with regimes that are considered radical and anti-West there is a trend in which harsh delegitimation actions are taken in the forms of sanction and at times military intervention. Clapham (1999: p.627) notes that in as far as the European Union treatment of cases of violations of rights is concerned there is a general outcry pertaining to transparency noting that the problem of transparency is further compounded by the absence of information in the public domain to make an application of human rights principles as a pillar of the European Union. It is these double standards that post colonialist would cite bringing into doubt whether it is standard procedure for the West to use human rights as a yardstick to gauge governance systems and their regimes in post colonial states.
  5. The West tends to battle with the legitimacy question in dealing with its former colonies. Regimes in the South often find post colonial theory appealing as it questions the legitimacy of their former colonizers who through colonial conquest were themselves involved in gross human rights abuses even after the signing and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 in determining how regimes should treat their own citizens in the South.
  6. While post colonial theory falls far short of addressing the democratization and human rights quest in post-colonial states it does raise important questions on uniformity in the application of delegitimation. These questions do have a bearing on the legitimacy of the actions of the West, foreign policy positions as they put into doubt the existence of a universal justice order as other states generally are treated with a ‘soft spot’ despite the existence of evidence showing their government’s gross human rights abuse records.
  7. g.      Increasingly, the west has come under criticism from post colonialism over its ‘war on terror’ operations in Iraqi and the Middle East at large after the United Nations failed to validate the existence of weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons. This has raised an important question in international relations on ‘who will police the police’ the question arises out of what Doxey 1996: p.1 explains as the crisis of the veto power in the UN Security Council comprised of China, USA, Britain, France, and Soviet Union now Russia. She contends that from the onset this setting rendered immunity of the five member states, their allies and clients from UN sanctions. Needless to say that post colonial theory has been apt and vocal in questioning the criteria of arriving at the composition of the UN Security Council.

4.2 Policy Recommendations

Having laid out the findings emanating from this research, it would be incomplete to conclude the work without giving policy alternatives or recommendations. These may be erstwhile ideas in crafting a mutually acceptable international order. The following are some of the recommendations:

  1. The West on Double Standards, the west needs to work on its legitimation as well as developing a uniform framework that does not exempt its allies who have gross human rights abuses records. This entails a uniform application of delegitimation based on policy as well as reconsidering the constitution of membership to the United nations Security Council such that it embraces diversity in decision making and in composition has diverse membership. Needless to say the implied ‘exemption or immunity’ of the top five states and their allies from UN sanctions needs discarding.
  2. Human Rights as a foundation stone for development, post colonial theory should transform itself by accepting the fact that humans have an intrinsic desire to be free and authoritarian tendencies cannot be sufficiently justified and hidden under the banner of the threat on continued domination by neo-liberalism. This entails the appreciation of the value of freedoms, equality, justice and universal suffrage on indigenous peoples potential to be productive. The Zimbabwean case shows that the absence of the rule of law and gross violations have a negative ripple effect on economic performance and equally the same can be said of isolation from the international community.
  3. Cultural   Relativism, culture often plays a critical role in how people are governed as well as defining their aspirations. The use of culture as a pretext to avoid universal suffrage is inadequate noting the ever dynamic nature of culture. Cultural relativity should be understood within the context of an ever evolving g society with new exposures and hence new demands. The culture of pre-colonial Zimbabwe certainly has been amended owing to external relations and can certainly not be the pillar of denying citizens universal rights. In a similar way culture has changed and so has the governance structure and systems changed. Cultural Relativism needs to be responsive to the new demands for freedoms and democratic governance. This response does not in itself entail surrendering national sovereignty. Attempts at creating a close knit between sovereignty and democratization by dismissing freedoms as a neo-liberal concept that undermine the state’s capacity to independent government in a hostile international system will only result in an argument that does little justice to the people’s quest to enjoy human rights. Douzinas p.70 makes an apt argument by noting that the abolition of the slave trade was a as a result of the re-interpretation of the notion of free  and slaves which transcended the race aspect, in a similar way the notion of human rights should be viewed as transcending race, geo-political location and culture.
  4. Delegitimation means, international relations needs to pay particular attention to the question of what delegitimation methods are acceptable. This question is pertinent as it addresses the questions around uniformity as well as the effects of measures imposed on non complying governments. The paper is cognizant of the increasing argument of the ineffectiveness of military intervention and sanctions which tend to have crippling effects on the population than the intended offenders of human rights.

 

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The preceding chapters have explored the concept of delegitimation by interpreting it using the Zimbabwe case study as well as coming up with policy recommendations that may shape reforms in  the international system. This chapter draws a balance sheet from the theoretical and empirical contestations in the paper reasserting the main research thesis and opening up a hive of other possible areas in international relations in relation to human rights and the de-legitimation process.

5.1 Summary

The research began by looking at what constitutes the process of legitimation and developed the opposite of what de-legitimation entails reaching a conclusion that it can be summarized as an act of revoking the legal status of a regime thus making it invalid, illegal and unacceptable in this particular research the yardstick of measure is adherence to human rights. The paper has highlighted the different measures that can be taken by both individual states and the international community in invalidating a regime that undermines fundamental human rights in regards to its citizens. These measures may include though not limited to sanctions, humanitarian intervention, military intervention, no fly zones, travel restrictions among others. The empirical evidence on Zimbabwe, with other cases being cited, has been used to establish the impetus for the West’s delegitimation processes on authoritarian regimes. In the process the paper has read outward from the conventional explanations rooted in post colonial theory. A conclusive position that agrees with Douzinas’ p. 70 statement that the universality of human rights can no longer be doubted has been arrived at thus promulgating a new paradigm on how post colonial theory should analyze the discourse on human rights.

5.2 Evaluation

The paper has developed an alternative interpretation of delegitimation arguing that it is not sufficient to dismiss the process as simply an embodiment of neoliberal encroachment given people’s desires to be free and enjoy fundamental rights. In so doing the paper has offered a human rights centered development approach that does not however undermine the sovereign state system which post colonial theory tends to prefer in a hostile international sphere. The paper has argued that granting citizens fundamental rights does not endanger the sovereignty of the state but strengthen its international relations as well as develops the capacity of its citizens to develop the national economy. The notion of fixation by cultural relativists has been questioned in line with the ever dynamic nature of culture. An intrinsic desire by humans to enjoy fundamental rights has been affirmed. In its findings the research has prescribed a set of policy shifts both in international politics and state foreign affairs departments.

The paper took a critical approach to de-legitimation processes analyzing the universality of the actions, possible implications and interpretations by different scholars and practitioners in infant democracies. While supporting the discourse on human rights the paper also raised questions around neo-liberal tendencies in the application by the West to the process. The research therefore has prompted questions on whether the use of human rights in either legitimizing or de-legitimizing a state seeks to stabilize a nation and has avoided reaching dismissive conclusions

The work by Ranger et al has been of particular interest in this research as their assertions were largely shaped within the African nationalist school of history in which they emphasized that de-legitimation of African states was largely the result of ‘neo-colonialism.’ It has been the preoccupation of this research to rethink these assertions within a context of human rights violations and people’s quest for freedoms and democratic governance. Interesting arguments have been cemented by the paper’s global outlook to de-legitimation than simply using the Zimbabwean case study alone. The paper also raised questions around cultural relativism and political realism in relation to internationalization of human rights and whether nations should act in the best interest of power at the expense of individual freedoms and liberties. It is against this interrogation that a balance sheet has be drawn on whether de-legitimation of authoritarian regimes is oriented towards achieving stability or is a de-stabilizing strategy seeking to achieve perpetual existence of neo-liberalism and an action tantamount to the interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

A clarion call has been equally made to post colonial theory towards a new paradigm shift as people’s clamors for equality and a state justice order that conforms though not necessarily surrendering sovereign authority to international norms. The work by Ranger et al on delegitimation, largely shaped by nationalist struggles for independence from colonial bondage, has remained static and risks being outlived by new discourses shaped by the ever dynamism of culture and new demands for political freedoms. The paper has argued that the two positions (radical universalism and post colonial theory) are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary development approaches and that the paradox of universalism and realpolitik is more apparent than real. Using empirical evidence the research has shown that the Zimbabwe Case (delegitimation of the Mugabe regime by the West) cannot be adequately understood from a post colonialist perspective given the gross human rights violations that the regime has inflicted on its people as well as drawing conclusions on the economic downturn. Though not specifically paying attention on the effects of sanctions as a delegitimation tool for authoritarian regimes the case study has shown that human rights abuses can be a catalyst to national economic and social de-development which can also be compounded by external sanctions.

The research has managed to critic radical universalism as a discourse that has been dismissed by post colonialism as a means of retaining and maintains neoliberal domination of the weaker states by proposing a definitive shift on the human rights policy in the West. The West needs to work on a blanket framework in dealing with delegitimation as a foreign policy issue that disregards alliances with authoritarian regimes such that uniformity is applied in the course of actions taken to strip legitimacy of regimes that violate international law. Cases in Egypt, Israel and Syria have been cited in this regard as representing contrasting policy positions.

5.3 Future Work

International relations will need to pay particular attention to the question of ‘what delegitimation methods are acceptable in international diplomacy.’ This question is pertinent as it addresses the questions around uniformity as well as the effects of measures imposed on non complying governments. The paper is cognizant of the increasing argument of the ineffectiveness of military intervention and sanctions which tend to have crippling effects on the population than the intended offenders of human rights abuses. Prospects around an independent United Nations Security Council’s decision making body are equally important to address given the outcry that it is overtly controlled and composed of Western Allies with the exception of China and Russia who are perceived as bringing a divergent view in the council’s deliberations. Given the histories of struggles for freedoms that shape the history of mankind such as the French Revolution of 1789, the widespread revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the first Chimerenga (war of liberation) in Zimbabwe of 1896, the Maji Maji Rebellion of Tanganyika among others, IR theorists may need to establish whether the discourse on human rights is a new concept that comes to life with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, that is whether the year signals a disjuncture in international relations or it is the fallacy hidden under the banner of internationalization. In the course of the research as highlighted above Brown offered a new way of engaging in international relations namely the revisiting of key terms that define delegitimation. The debate on semantics as pitted against practices may need further exploring in regards to its value in creating a mutually acceptable international system.

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Global Lessons for Zimbabwe – Exploring Truth and Reconciliation Commisions: Unsaid truths

In my exploration of the discourse on human rights I acknowledge the controversy that surrounds it but sum them as commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being. Human rights violations occur when actions by state (or non-state) actors abuse, ignore, or deny basic human rights (including civil, political, cultural, social, and economic rights).Zimbabwe should not see a repeat of the 1987 cosmetic unity accordThe Holocaust atrocities are tentatively estimated at 12 million, in South Africa death at the hands of the apartheid regime account to 21000. The war in Chile cost a staggering 1.7 million lives, the civil war in the Democratic Republic Congo is estimated to have decimated some 5-6 million, 800,000 men, women, and children perished in the Rwandan genocide, perhaps as many as three quarters of the Tutsi population. Similarly Zimbabwe has had its own share of human rights violations both past and on-going which the current government of national unity acknowledges. That said it is the numerous calls within civics and political parties for a truth and reconciliation commission to be set up to redress past violations and ‘heal’ Zimbabwe that this paper seeks to interrogate. The preoccupation of the research is not to undermine calls for peace and reconciliation but to provide the unsaid critical debate around the effectiveness of truth commissions using global experiences and giving a voice to the ‘cowed’ victims and their families. This paper argues that the truth and reconciliation approach is seldom ineffective in addressing past violations with respect to victims of past human rights violations in nations undergoing transitions to democracy as more emphasis is usually given to the democratisation process and priority to avoiding sliding the nation into democratic regression. The paper is therefore an attempt to give a voice to the ‘silenced’ victims of human rights violations and their families by expressing their experiences with the truth and reconciliation approach interalia the role of the judiciary and construction of historical past in the reconciliation process. The main thesis is substantiated by empirical evidence mainly from the cases in South Africa, Kenya, Germany and Rwanda while an attempt is made to reflect on other global examples. The treatise is structured in six sections with the first briefly touching on the definition of key terms which are human rights and transitional justice at the same time situating Human Rights violations within truth and reconciliation processes.  The second section considers the conventional framework to transitional justice and truth commissions while the third is a critical analysis of effectiveness of truth commissions. The last section is the conclusion which draws a balance sheet on the advantages and disadvantages of truth commissions raising further questions that may inform research and dialogue on the best way of tackling reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

The United Nations in the GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice: (2010: p.2) developed guidelines for transitional justice and defines it as:

Transitional justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, facilitating initiatives in respect of the right to truth, delivering reparations, institutional reform and national consultations. Whatever combination is chosen must be in conformity with international legal standards and obligations.

It is also important to consider exploring the purpose of history in reflection in truth and reconciliation processes. Reflection can also be understood within the broad concept of memorialization with a clear example being the Rwandan Genocide memorials that take place between 7th April and July 4th every year. Maier Defines a Truth Commission as

a panel that attempts to establish the facts of human rights abuses under an earlier regime or set of governmental practices, but refrains from prosecuting the perpetrators who testify under its auspices.

images (1)It is this definition of a Truth Commission that lays the basis for further scrutiny of its effective and as shall be sustained in this paper lays the basis for doubt of its effectiveness to correct past wrongs and more important to arrest possible resurfacing of human rights abuses. Truth Commissions offer a negotiated avenue to justice and have become a feature associated with transitions to democracy. Central to this process is a discontinuity in ‘political regimes’ (p. 262). It is this paper’s contention that the internationalized, standardized definition and norms within the framework of truth commissions fails to grasp the unique intricacies of each community and the feelings of victims and families of victims of past violations. The truth and reconciliation process is therefore largely a top-down approach. Truth Commissions require an in depth interaction and understanding of how victims require justice which from victims and their families accounts may require an elimination of the idea of ‘trading the truth for amnesty’ by past perpetrators and their absence in new political dispensations. While this exposition may somewhat appear radical in that it fails to capture the attention to democratic transition it is in essence the presence of officials from a past regime in public office that triggers feelings of inadequacy in the reconciliation processes. Hayner 2002: p.86 notes that there is suspicion that truth commissions are conveniently employed as a means of evading accountability and holding perpetrators of past human rights abuses responsible for crimes committed.  The process of lustration which is the banning of past violators of human rights is therefore inadequately implemented as there is a tendency to establish ‘political sacrificial lambs’ with the main perpetrators or architects of violence unaccountable. The Kenyan elections of 2007 which saw the murdering of political rivals pitted against Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki is a case to note, whereas blame for violence was transferred to Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto who have since been indicted at the International Criminal Court and now face charges of genocide the former two candidates went unindicted or punished.

Hayner (2002: p.87) offers an intriguing explanation on the difference between truth commissions and judicial process by noting the two are separable and each cannot adequately take the place of the other. In her account the truth commissions are an effective way of strengthening relations in a torn nation and usually are the best method of attaining justice in a nation where the judiciary is weak, biased and often compromised. While this can be a valid reflection of the truth commission the scope in which the truth commissions can be said to be impartial and unbiased in an already biased political setting is questionable. Without outward dismissal of the argument it is important to note that political leaders in a transition are the key drivers of the truth commission. The South African case is a classic example in which the new political dispensation led by the Africa National Congress used its supporter and ally Desmond Tutu to steer the commission’s work hence accusations that the commission was overtly biased on the African National Congress with less hearings on blacks who had instigated and masterminded acts of terrorism against white. Maier captures this debate aptly by noting that this can be justified by the transition under the guise of a ‘necessary’ past evil.  The Zimbabwean case also offers an insight into this debate where the independence of the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, established in accordance with section 7(c) of the Global Political Agreement of 2008, has failed to deliver truth and reconciliation as the country is under a transition with the body that is empowered with the duty of reconciling the nation compromised as it is constituted by political parties in the transitional government. Mbire (2011: p4) notes that the approach employed in the Zimbabwean case is largely that of forgiveness than bringing perpetrators of human rights violation to account for their crimes. Again the process of lustration is out of question as more emphasis is given to the transition than truth and reconciliation process.

At this juncture it is important to consider an erstwhile question on the extent to which the truth and reconciliation process heals a past while it does not jeopardize efforts at fostering democracy. In this section an attempt is made to analyze the effectiveness of the employing judiciary processes in correcting past injustices. Hayner p.89 aptly notes that the successful prosecution of perpetrators of violence is rarely possible in nations undergoing transitions arguing that they are seldom employed and where they are instituted they are often few and slow in being concluded. The case of Rwanda, which has fared relatively well, shows that only 150 cases have come before the courts. Hayner offers a convincing explanation to this trend which ranges from weak judicial systems, corrupt official, absence of concrete evidence and the absence of safety nets for witnesses giving evidence in courts.  While this explanation is convincing it is not totally exhaustive as more importantly and as shown before it is the set up and composition of transitional governments that make the process of delivering justice through courts almost impossible.  Maier p.263 aptly captures this point by arguing that ‘Prudential silence’ is often eminent in cases involving a previous military regime with perceptions being that the violence and atrocities committed were a necessary evil however there is reasonable doubt cast on this ‘silence’ as it lays the basis for an unstable democratic foundation. Thabo Mbeki quoted in Boraine (2000: p.143) expressed that there were calls within the ANC to institute punitive justice, trials and ‘hanging’ of white perpetrators of abuses, despite being a popular call he notes ‘Had there been a threat of the Nuremberg-style trials over members of the apartheid security establishment, we would never have undergone peaceful change.’ Historians are agreed that the Nuremberg trials held in the aftermath of the Second World War in response to ‘crimes against humanity’ or Holocaust failed to reconcile people.

Post apartheid South Africa was faced with three options to redress past violation with the first being a blanket amnesty which was favored by the white apartheid officials and unpopular and untenable within the ANC which had the majority of victims of past violations, the second approach was the Nuremberg style  trials which were popular with ANC activists but posed a threat to the transition while the rational third way they embraced was the truth commission which had limited amnesty and sought the restoration of dignity. In response to transition as has been argued earlier transition to democracy is given more primacy than criminal proceedings that can pose a threat to an infant democracy. In most cases these reconciliation approaches often come as a result of ‘transition by transaction’ than by a radical revolutionary approach. In an interview with Mandela quoted in Boraine, Thabo Mbeki disclosed that a peaceful transition would not have ensued following strong warning from military personnel if member of the armed forces were to be subjected to public trials and prosecution.  Even in the latter case where power is claimed from a regime through a revolution instituting the Nuremburg style trials would be futile in cementing social relations in divided nation. Sentiments for punitive justice are often raised by victims of violence and seem to resonate on security of victims, Santiago of Chile quoted in Boraine p.147 ‘How is reconciliation possible when lies and denials are institutionalized by responsible authorities?’ Similarly in South Africa victims felt that the government cannot forgive the perpetrators and it was only the victim’s decision to forgive and forgiveness entailed knowing the truth.

Unlike orthodox views that developed a soft spot for truth commissions, Boraine offers a solid evaluation of the truth and reconciliation process by noting that despite scoring relative success the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa faced a series of challenges that included strong sentiments by victims of abuses that there was no need for amnesty at all and that healing could only be achieved by trials and punishment. These victims felt the injustice of a clause that guaranteed the impunity from further questioning, investigation or trials of those who came in the open and participated in the commission’s hearings. It can be said that the Truth Commission in South Africa was too ‘protective’ of perpetrators than it did to ‘heal’ the victim. There were attempts by disenchanted groups within South Africa to challenge the amnesty clause in courts but the court ruled in favor of the commission stating that the scope of amnesty in the commission was in accordance with international norms. It is at this stage that it is important to make a recap of an earlier claim that the scope of these truth commissions tends to be largely internationalized (that is in accordance with international norms) fail to capture the intricate requirements and interests of victims of past abuses.

Having explored the challenges that face reconciliation processes within the indigenous court setting, the International Criminal Court requires some attention. In some scenarios new governments may institute both commissions and trials simultaneously. The International Criminal Court was established in 1998 after 120 countries agreed to set up an international court that would offer international justice trying individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. There is a debate that has questioned the operations of the criminal court mainly from the third world with post-colonial theory arguing that the court is an instrument of neo-liberalism which has only tried leaders from the developing nations. This discourse is also partly responsible for the decision by the Africa Union to form a continental court, the Africa Court on Human Rights. However, this paper will concentrate itself on justice at the court than to question the bigger debate on the ideological foundations of the court. While the court often has tried successful cases mainly against dictatorship regimes, there are growing calls to empower indigenous courts so that they can discharge impartial justice in the absence of foreign intervention. The case of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto has seen an outcry within the Kenyan society for internal due processes than ‘external’ processes. While this argument obviously is popular with developing nations it is important to note that the challenge is with the often weak ill resourced, biased and compromised judiciary. In this case the international court offers a beacon of hope for victims of past violations.

In dealing with questions of truth it is important to note that the idea of the ‘truth’ is inextricably inseparable to truth commissions’ work and the reconciliation process; however it is this idea of truth that also posed questions on the facts for commissions, truth and sincerity among other questions.  This section will be devoted at exploring the debate on the ‘truth.’ Sustaining the argument that the truth can be a fabrication by perpetrators to seek amnesty, there are discrepancies on the whole notion of the truth as some is concealed for strategic political reasons even by successive governments that come after dictatorship regimes. The Enquette Commission established by the German parliament which sought to raise awareness of the mal practices of the previous regime however interesting to note is that focus can be paid on the establishment and role of the Stasi or ‘secret police records.’ This therefore points to the different types of truth and disclosure processes and the whole motivation in transitional governments to maintain peace. Slye in Rotberg and Thompson (2000: p.171) poses a question for truth commissions noting that the South African case was to be faced  by the bigger question of whether amnesty had to supersede the whole objectives of truth, reconciliation and accountability. The truth is therefore compromised by ‘mid-night’ deliberations between political leadership and different accounts fabricated to suit the amnesty bracket in cases where a political or military leadership in the past regime may pose a threat to national peace and security in the new dispensation. Sly notes that prior to the South African case the truth in former commissions added little value to the public’s knowledge of past occurrences or violations. In this vein, it can be said that an element of prudential silence is often dominant in commission with little ‘truth’ informing public discourse.

In unearthing the notion of truth one cannot do justice without an examination of the Holocaust. The notion of truth is subjective and earlier arguments have shown that it is prone to fabrication and distortion. It is this argument that is also given by Holocaust deniers who argue that it was never a policy of the Nazi to exterminate Jews; that the gas chambers never existed among other violations that took place during the Nazi reign. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum states that Holocaust denial is an attempt to downplay the truth of gross violations, however other nations in Europe have since enacted legislation that bars it whereas in the United States it is protected under freedoms of speech. Young 1993: p.2 observes that in the case of the Holocaust there are numerous mutually different reasons that motivate people to engage in memorials some are motivated by the desire to impart knowledge on the next generation while others are driven by expediency. Young makes an interesting observation thus, ‘by themselves monuments are of little value, mere stones in the landscape’ however what binds people together is the national memory and ‘identity’ yet the capacity for change in behavior as a result of this memorialization is not apparent. This paper will not attempt to answer whether or not the Holocaust is a fact but what can be deduced from this account is the extent to which the ‘truth’ is compromised and in shaping a historical account there is no consensus on a specific juncture in history. However it is not the purpose of this paper to try and universalize historical narratives.

Even those who support the idea of truth commissions also recognize that the procedure is problematic with regards to politics and justice especially when officials who were past perpetrators can go ‘scot-free.’ Boraine quoted in Maier p. 264 notes that there are huge differences between amnesty and disclosure, and it is that difference that raises disenchantment with democracy noting that there is a tendency to trade the truth through open testimonials for freedom or amnesty in ‘political abuses.’ Examples include the South African case where either victims or families of victims were left embittered as perpetrators traded their immunity through disclosure

Despite the seeming fact that retributive justice may not be applied the relevance of historical truth in this case often helps deter a ‘relapse into shameful practices’ which may include revenge and or further perpetration of violations or abuses. The truth commission is therefore predicated on the idea that establishing the historical record accurately and securing its public knowledge is a requisite for successful democratization. The role of the history and the historian also needs to be put under the microscope: Evidence gathered by the truth commission can serve as a source for historical narration by the historian while an interrogation of the findings of the commission is recommended given the negotiation process that takes place within the commission especially regarding the character appearance of public officials from the findings of the commission {there is a tendency to avoid the harsh truth} such as there may be claims of working under orders, or compulsion thus issues of motivation are likely distorted. Investigating the source of the establishment of the Commission itself is important especially to fond put the compelling conditions within the power corridors.

Further not all truth commissions predicated on settings daunting tasks like the South African TRC, an example would be the Chilean experience, thus an emphasis of facts than historical interpretation is often give as an excuse basing on that historical interpretation will always be subject to debate. The argument is that of maintaining a sense of ‘objectivity.’ Interesting to note is that a trial will not base its facts on these official accounts (truths) as it may lose credibility but ‘the history a trial teaches must emerge from its agonistic dramaturgy.’

 

There exist a seeming paradox between the history (historian) and political trials yet both serve to deliver justice. Hayner notes that the two are not mutually devoid though different but work to complement each other. The historian endeavors to give justice through his narration of the past occurrences and thus gives justice through public education or awareness whereas the political trials seek ‘justice of the law.’ p.270

The notion of justice itself is equally problematic in both spheres – in history it largely deals with issues of objectivity against historiographical motivations (subjectivity) whereas in law jurists are not agreed on its meaning especially when the question Justice to who is raised. There is diversity in defining what is morally acceptable and what justice entails. People have generally different views as to what law in general or with regard to specific rules is for. Despite this seeming disparity Maier notes that both in so far as a judge and a historian exercise their duties in a liberal manner they exhibit jurisprudential wisdom – they must judge cases based on individual bases, general principles with an underlying knowledge and appreciation of how normal people are expected to behave, therefore judgment is based on normative plausibility inspired by Aristotle’s approach to civic virtue.

Narratives therefore provide a key ingredient in these processes as only when a narration has been constructed does establishment of causality become possible. We cannot understand the motivation to abuses or past occurrences without a clear narration of how events unfolded lest there is a risk of reaching a conclusion on ‘senseless’ violence as a cause. With narration:

We understand causality in complex scenarios where there were a series of protracted violation as we establish the role of each individual within an institutional framework, a link can be established between earlier events which often account for later ones in what political science refers to as a ‘path dependency’

Having explored the contested theoretical frameworks and broader experiences across the globe with the truth and reconciliation process it is imperative to look at some of the individual cases that give pointers on key weaknesses of the process by providing useful cases of ‘behind the scenes’ investigations on the victims and perpetrator’s responses and view in evaluating what Hayner celebrates as a useful example of successful truth and reconciliation process under the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In an interview with families of victims, it is apparent that they felt that knowing the truth opened fresh wounds and forgiveness was neither achieved, some never got to understand and identify with the value system of the commission. Participating in the hearings did not necessarily resonate with forgiveness and identity creation of nationhood. In their view the families of three murdered ANC cadres evaluated the TRC as having provided a thin sheet of veneer beneath which lay deep feelings of hate and division. Wilson also noted that the final report of the TRC was neither available for public scrutiny nor was it affordable.  It is against this background that one may be drawn into concluding that the truth commissions may not necessarily bring healing but can open fresh wounds and leave victims and their families more agitated for justice.

From the foregoing arguments presented it can thus be concluded that  while the truth and reconciliation process is an attempt at bridging internal national conflicts it equally poses numerous questions  on whether it is an effective tool for bringing social harmony in post human rights violations eras.  Zimbabwe needs to engage in robust dialogue that is citizen inclusive. The paper has explored the key concepts of reconciliation processes giving empirical evidence and at times recommending the reform to approach. However more questions still arise that may need further researches which include the conditions under which a successful truth and reconciliation process can occur, revisiting whether it is necessary to maintain international norms in approaching the question of past violations and an investigation into the psychological conditioning of perpetrators, victims and their families in truth and reconciliation processes. The paper also recommends authorities in Zimbabwe and its citizens to engage in a thorough investigation into the timing of the process of reconciliation, that is, whether it should be employed in a transitional period or when democratic transition is firmly rooted.


 

Zimbabwe a false start: Rethinking Development

The past decade has witnessed immense debate on what could have destroyed a promising African economy with mainly two proposed theories or rather narratives. These accounts are partly shaped by a polarized political discourse with one acutely arguing that US and West imposed sanctions through ZIDERA passed by the 107th United States Congress in 2001 sucked the main blood artery of the economy and began a process of syphoning out Direct Foreign Investments and freezing credit lines from Bretton Woods institutions and GATT (broadly all IFIs where the USA has interest and exercise considerable control). This account is largely built upon citing section 4(c) of ZIDERA on financial restrictions. I will not dwell into greater detail at this stage, it is reserved for in depth analysis at a later stage of this paper. The second dominant contestation alleges that the Structural Adjustment Programs (precisely the Economic Structural Adjustment Program [ESAP]) dealt a shattering blow to an infant economy by opening up economic activity to well established global capital hence stifled the development and growth of infant indigenous industries while a protracted gross exploitation of labor ensued which obviously meant an erosion of the working classes buying power and extensive cuts in government social expenditure. While the two narratives have largely shaped public opinion on Zimbabwe’s economic misfortunes, in this paper I maintain that seeds for economic downturn were sown in the initial years of independence and that by 1987 Zimbabwe’s economy had knelt down on its knees and what followed after 1987 simply provided a fertile ground for the growth of economic downturn whose seeds had germinated in the aftermath of the independence celebrations. In this paper I dismiss the structural approach to understanding political economy by offering a coherent and sustained processual understanding of economic de-growth and de-development.

Not Yet Uhuru

Zimbabwe attained its independence as a result of both military and diplomatic overtures, this paper will not get into detail on the intricacies of the liberation but an international issue that is of interest is the role of the United Nations in extending economic embargo on Rhodesia through the mandatory sanction during the last 6 years of minority white rule. The net effect of these sanctions from the United Nations was to render the Rhodesian economy a closed entity which could not compete with the rest of the world. Nevertheless the economy continued to produce for internal consumption and entered into bilateral trade agreement with apartheid South Africa in what appeared to be a sanctions busting strategy. Suffice to say the period immediately prior to independence had witnessed List’s Model of Infant Industry protection which of course occurred inspite thereof. Zimbabwe therefore inherited a relatively prosperous indigenous industry with the dollar at its strongest in other terms the economy had surpassed the Rostow’s take off stage. At the time of independence annual inflation was 5.4 percent and month-to-month inflation was 0.5 percent.  What was needed at 1980 was the recapitalization of the infant industry and gradual opening of the economy while the state continued to protect these industries using a priority index to enable the economy to move from internal consumption to trading in the international sphere while still servicing the domestic market

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Rethinking the Worldview of Imperialism in International Relations

97p/29/doey/7601/dr04/dr04x22Studies in the causality-effect of ‘new imperialism’ are a highly contested and conjectural. There is immense debate on the motive(s) of the impetus of the mass physical annexation of Pacific and African territories by Europe during the last quarter of the 19th century let alone whether or not this was a new era in the global capitalist system. The latter debate has also seen much discord on the precise dating of the imperialism of the 19th Century to which it shall be proven that theories of imperialism fail to explain why this ‘new imperialism’ took place at the time it did and why not before as each theory shall be subjected to expositions and evaluations. This paper shall argue that economic factors played a more significant role compared to any other while trying to show the nexus between economic and strategic factors as well as social or philanthropic factors. Questions around the historiographies of the subject shall be a key issue in discussing the paper preferring to offer a rather ‘silenced’ non west view. The treatise is structured in six parts; the first part shall seek to define imperialism while the second section will interrogate T.O Ranger’s argument on industrialisation and imperialism. The third section looks at economic theories of imperialism and notes that despite being classified as economic theories they offer diametrically opposed accounts of imperialism while the fourth part shall relate to strategic and social theories. The fifth section shall look at the significance of the Berlin Conference with events on both the European and African turf being used to offer a non west view of imperialism. The last section shall sum up the arguments built around the thesis and draw a balance between various theories of imperialism while strengthening the non west account on imperialism.

Scholars are not agreed on the definition of imperialism but all seem to agree in relation to the late 19th Century as referring some form of exercise of physical annexation or control by a nation state over another it may manifest itself in various forms such as colonialism and of late neo-imperialism. Other categories of imperialism may include economic, social, political or cultural imperialism. This paper seeks to confine itself to the imperialism of the late 19th century which saw the physical annexation of Pacific and African territories, Africa is mentioned more than the Pacific in this treatise mainly due to the extensive nature of imperial activities that took place on the continent than on the Pacific territories(W.Rodney 1971: p.63) however it is not sufficient enough to undermine the Pacific states.

Orthodox school provided products of industrialisation such as the advent of the Maxim guns, the steam engines and the cure for malaria, quinine, as having caused the imperialism of the 19th Century stating that these gave Europe an urge to conquer the non-west world. The school derives its argument from remarks by Hilaire Belloc (1898: p41) ‘whatever happens we have the Maxim Gun and they have not.’ It is erstwhile to consider Ranger’s (1979: p46) argument in dismissing this school of thought by not that these simply facilitated but did not cause the Scramble for Africa. Thatcher’s argument is logical following that steam ship engines made travel to Africa convenient and faster as Europeans no longer relied on the ‘unreliable anabatic and katabatic winds.’ The maxim guns gave them a military advantage over their counterparts while quinine opened up Africa which had hitherto been referred as the white man’s grave. The Ranger argument, also shared by Thatcher, is sound as these developments did not warrant physical annexation of colonies but simply accelerated interaction of Europe and other continents, there is, therefore, no direct causality correlation between imperialism and these three developments.

As set out from the onset much of the body knowledge that exists on imperialism is largely from a European perspective. Foneseca and Jerem (2012: p1) observe that the discipline of international relations owes its existence to the European export of a particular world view and political system around the nation state and that despite decolonisation this view has largely remained intact and dominant. The dominant image of Africa projected by European writers in the nineteenth century was that of a place of savagery and chaos. Africa was known as the “Dark Continent,” a land deprived of the light of Western civilization, education, culture, religion, industry, and progress. The African landscape was like nothing encountered in Europe, and early explorers emphasized the differences between the cities or countryside they knew at home and the tropical jungle, arid open spaces, and indigenous flora and fauna of Africa. The people of Africa were characterized by Westerners as lacking in morality and intelligence, being perpetually childlike, demonic, and practicing outlandish, barbaric customs, Boahen (1990: p23). Because of the overwhelmingly negative reports and portrayals of Africa and Africans, by late in the century most Westerners regarded colonization of the African land their moral duty; it was the “White man’s burden,” in Rudyard Kipling’s phrase, to dominate Africans until they could be sufficiently civilized to take their place in the world. By 1900, almost ninety percent of Africa was under European control, and the myth of the “Dark Continent” and the image of the deprived, depraved African native had taken hold of the Western consciousness, Gale Cengage: (2005: p.4). This debate shall be further explored in the second part of this paper where an analysis of social and philanthropic theories will be subjected to scrutiny.

One of the classic theories of imperialism was provided by the radical-liberal economist J A Hobson in 1902 using the theory of under consumption. Hobson sought to explain the rise of the “new imperialism” in the 1870s and 1880s when Britain, together with the other Great European powers, engaged in a scramble for colonies. According to Hobson this move towards formal control over colonies was a break from the previous British pattern, where it exercised its global dominance through free trade and “informal” mechanisms of political control.

Hobson argues that advanced industrial capitalism produced an excess of capital (which he terms ‘a glut of capital’) that was unable to find any profitable outlets in the domestic economy. This led to the search for new markets abroad. The “taproot of imperialism” is not found in national pride but capitalist oligarchy. Hobson argued that imperialism is unnecessary and immoral, seeing imperialism as a result of the mal-distribution of wealth in a capitalist society that created a desire to spread markets in search of profit. It was this process that drove the pressure to annexe territories, both to safeguard existing investments and to secure areas for new investments. Hobson locates this drive to export capital as the result of the search for profits by “rentier” financial interests around the City of London, allied to certain sections of industry like arms manufactures and the shipping industry. Eric Hobsbawm offered a somewhat synced view with Hobson by arguing that the military supremacy of the capitalist countries was translated into formal conquest, annexation and administration from 1880 to 1914 and not before. Hobsbawm challenges the view that imperialism was nothing new arguing that the term only came into vocabulary in the 1870s in Britain and only became popularised in the 1890s. Dismisses non-Marxist analysts of imperialism as failing to explain the nexus between economics and politics and why imperialism was both a novel and historically central development and simply denying facts which were obvious. He argues that the need to open new profitable markets in the face of the Great Depression was the main reason for the late 19th century expansion.

While Hobson’s theory of under consumption gained prominence in providing a clue to the causality of the late 19th Century it is important to note that when put under an analytical microscope it falls short of explaining imperialism as one takes a country by country analysis of imperialism; the theory is not supportable on ‘a glut of capital’ given that Portugal was bankrupt and constantly referred to as the poor man of Europe R J. Hammond (1966: p.72). When applied to France, G.N Uzoigwe (1978: p.207-213) shows empirical evidence of marginal or absence of French capital investments in West Africa he thus stated that ‘West Africa remained the neglected step-child of French bourse (foreign capital investment).’ Gallagher and Robinson (1953: …) also dismissed the theory by arguing that Hobson placed too much emphasis on the role of formal empire and directly ruled colonial possessions, not taking into account the significance of trading power, political influence and informal imperialism. They also argued that the difference in British foreign policy that Hobson observed between the mid-Victorian indifference to empire that accompanied free market economics, and the later high imperialism seen after 1870, was not a reality. While Gallagher and Robinson offer somewhat a criticism on Hobson, their theory shall also be put under scrutiny in this essay. Italy and Germany had emerged as new states in 1870 and 1871 respectively by the same coin their unifications took place as a result of protracted wars and were not on sound economic footing at the time of imperialism and could not have had excess capital seeking foreign investment D.Thompson (1984: p271). Given the material conditions that existed in Europe at the time doubt can be cast on Hobson’s theory as adequate in explaining the phenomenon besides Hobson did not give a precise dating of the imperialism which continues to be debated amongst historians.

P. Hayes (1984: p.185) offered a more convincing criticism of Hobson’s theory of under-consumption looking at the material conditions that existed in Europe after the abolition of the slave trade and patterns of colonial conquest and early administration noting that “what actually started the push into the sun baked islands of the Pacific and Africa was not so much of an overproduction of factory goods as an under supply of raw materials.” This view is subjected to criticism by Fieldhouse (1982: p.372) who analyses the differences between modern and old empires and dismisses the notion that ‘tropical empires were exploited to provide wealth for their masters. In his analysis he identifies five different features between the old and the modern empires. Fieldhouse (1982: p.393) also states that though new empires were politically centralised they remained economically independent using their own revenues and received subsidies from their masters. He also dismisses the idea that colonies were exploited for economic gain by their masters arguing that the modern empires were not artificially constructed economic machines, rather it were the political, social an emotional factors that made European expansion necessary in the 19th century than calculated imperialism. His views seem to be influenced by Disraeli the British Prime Minister who is quoted by Garlake et al (1989: p.15) as having said ‘these wretched colonies will be independent in a few years and are milestones around our necks.’ The same view shall be shown to be the pillar of the Gallagher and Robinson theses on Imperialism of Free Trade. This view by Fieldhouse does not sync with British imperial activities in Southern Rhodesia where the Pioneer Column’s first pre-occupation was to acquire large tracts of land and mines. Ranger (1979: p.17) shows that the failure to realise the second ‘Rand’ in Mashonaland gave rise to the impetus for war with the Matabeles as increasing myths developed that the Matabele king’s capital was built on a mountain of gold thus rendering the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 inevitable. In the same vein Fieldhouse’s view does not explain the variance in patterns of colonial conquest with other Africa states such as the Lozi Kingdom collaborating and offering their territories while there was generally no rush over Ethiopia which was largely viewed as of no economic value by imperialists. States that were deemed to be of economic value were more exposed to the ‘gold’ rushes of the late 19th Century as case being the inland kingdom  of the Mandinka Empire in West Africa which was believed to have large tracts of gold at its Boure gold mining fields, Webster and Boahen (1967: p.64-67)

Hobson’s work inspired Lenin to write his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1917. While inspired by the theory of under consumption Lenin’s work was a Marxist interpretation of imperialism. In the opening statement of his “Manifesto of the Communist Party” Karl Marx claims that, “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles… freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, in a word, oppressor and oppressed” (1977, p. 35).  Lenin developed his theory of imperialism amid an intensification of European engagement with the periphery. This intensification had begun during the second half of the 19th century. Domestically, capital was concentrating into large monopolistic corporations integrated with and led by a few large financial oligarchies. Lenin theorized that these two developments were intrinsically linked. The concentration of capital created inequality. Inequality in the core constrained aggregate demand levels. The general population could not absorb the mass of commodities achieved by higher levels of productive capacity. Insufficient demand created continual realization crises. The price of raw materials threatened profits further. The falling rate of profit required economic expansion to open up new regions for investment, sources of raw materials, and new consumer markets, Lenin (2000: p.33-38)

From the premise that the capitalist class controls the state politically, Lenin theorized that finance-capital, the dominant form of capital, used the state machinery to colonize the periphery. In the periphery, capitalists would use oppressed peripheral labor to produce primary commodities and raw materials cheaply; create affluent strata (peripheral elite) to consume expensive commodities imported from the core; and undermine indigenous industry, making the colonies dependent on core investment. The overall effect was that the core pumped wealth out of the periphery. The wealth flowing into the domestic economies of the core stifled the fall in the rate of profit. Lenin called this set of circumstances “imperialism.” Several specific consequences followed; two are notable. One, surpluses permitted the development of a “labor aristocracy,” a stratum of well-paid workers loyal to the capitalist class. Two, nation-state rivalry in the imperial system intensified nationalist sentiments among the working class and this deflected class struggle. Both of these effects functioned to strengthen the bourgeoisie over against the proletariat.

Although this strategy would work in the short-term, Lenin (2000: p.37) argued, in the longer term it would undermine first imperialism and then capitalism in the core. Nation-state rivalry would lead to inter-imperial wars. The costs (financial drain) and devastation (destruction of productive capacity) of these wars would weaken core nation-states, not only because the losers would find themselves in an unfavourable position and with a diminished capacity to exploit the periphery, but because nationalist movements in the periphery and anti-colonial wars would undermine the capacity of even victorious core nations to exploit the periphery. Once the core lost control over its colonies the imperium would stagnate domestically. Domestic economic stagnation would raise the level of antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat leading to a social revolution in the core. There are at least two major criticisms of the theory. First, the theory neglects the fundamental exploitative capitalist relations between core and periphery that existed for several hundred years before the “imperialist” phase, calling into question the claim that Lenin is describing something truly unique. What Lenin sees as the wave of colonization is actually an intensification in colonialism. It therefore appears, contrary to Lenin, that “imperialism” is a continuation of the same fundamental system of colonial domination not a new phase of capitalist development. Second, while some of what Lenin predicted happened, capitalism was not undermined in the period that most closely approximates the conditions he claimed would cause the core socialist revolution. The end of the war and the continued dominance of capitalism can be said to have been the major living criticism of his theory and like Hobson his theory did not offer a precise dating of the age of imperial colonisation.

Having shown that the two major economic theories of imperialism somewhat offer a flawed explanation of the phenomenon, considerable analysis is paid to social theories of imperialism with J. Schumpter’s Imperialism and Social Classes (1966: p.3) being the main theory for scrutiny partly owing to that his work though deriving from Charles Darwin’s survival of the fittest concept was the most prominent in providing the much needed diversity in imperialism. Mr. F.C. Selous’s account of his African Experiences (1893:p.3) had shaped international opinion on the barbaric nature of Africans giving the case of the Matabele and the Mashona on the Zimbabwean plateau alarming thus “the poor Mashonas unskilled in war, and living moreover in small communities scattered all over the country without a central government fell easy prey before the fierce invaders and very soon every stream ran red with their blood, whilst vultures and hyenas feasted undisturbed amidst the ruins of their devastated home, in a very few years there were no Mashonas in the open country…” he had gone to call upon the physical annexation of the Zimbabwean plateau under the guise of a proselytisation and civilising mission declaring that ‘if no end is put to them the Mashonas would be extinct.’ Nevertheless the theory faced a complete rebuttal from African scholars who interpreted it as not worth scholarly considerations viewing it as a racially motivated theory meant to portray Africans as uncivilised barbaric savages. Boahen (1990: p.6) argues that “Infact there was a refusal to see Africans as the creators of original cultures which flowered and survived over the centuries in patterns of their own making and which historians are unable to grasp unless they forgo their prejudices.” This brings the question of the historiographies that shape international opinion on Africa questionable given the backgrounds of writers at the time and their motives. A call can thus be made to revisit the ontologies and epistemologies that shape the body knowledge of the African pre-colonial societies and rethinking African ethnic and cultures as diverse, while there were cultures in the Kindgom of Bunyoro-Kittara that promoted human sacrifice, which cannot be condoned, on the whole the proselytising mission can thus be viewed as a pretext to colonial domination as it fails to provide a solid base as to why Europeans who had been present on the African continent had not taken fright in the cultures earlier on since the 16th century and what significant changes had taken place in the late 19th century that deemed mass proselytisation a necessity. Assa Okoth (2006: p.21) writing on pre-colonial Dahomey state notes that Europeans tended to exaggerate the scale of human sacrifices in Africa. While literary critics now acknowledge that the bulk of nineteenth-century literary works about Africa were racist and hardly representative of the real Africa, they also claim that the Western image of Africa in the twenty-first century is based on those nineteenth-century ideas. They lament that Hollywood movies, the Western news media, and literary works by Westerners continue to represent Africa as a backward place whose people need Western intervention to save themselves. According to these critics, Africans’ accomplishments, complexity, and humanity are rarely portrayed. These critics claim that the myths of the “Dark Continent” and the Africans as “Other” remain as strong as they ever were in many regards, making Africa vulnerable to the changing face of Western imperialism Cengage (2005: p.6)

Gallagher and Robinson in their article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” marked a sharp break with the orthodox theory of Victorian imperialism. Gallagher and Robinson rejected the idea of a supposed mid-Victorian period of anti-imperialism (“mid-Victorian indifference”), arguing that in order to properly understand the phenomenon of nineteenth century imperialism it was necessary to redefine the historiographical approach, to include the concept of “informal empire”, which to them “ought to be a commonplace. They proposed a new definition of imperialism, as being a process of integrating new regions into an expanding economy by political means (through an active government policy).The final component of the hypothesis was the theme of continuity in this process of imperialism. They also rejected the idea that imperialism could be neatly categorized into distinct and separate phases of “indifference” and “enthusiasm”, dependent upon the rise and fall of free trade. For them, imperialism was a continuous event that operated through various methods, informal and formal- a view expressed in the phrase, “trade with informal control if possible: trade with rule. For the two Victorians, Africa was colonised for its strategic geographical position as it offered the nearest route to the Indias where British economic interests lay. They argue the British occupation of Egypt was necessitated by an internal revolt (Urabi Pasha Revolt) which threatened the construction of the Suez Canal. They argue that the fact that the British did not invest in their colonies not until the end of company rule is clear evidence to show that they had no economic interests in the region. Needless to point out that criticism to this theory has largely come from African scholars who question the extent to which strategic forces can be adequately separated from economic interests. Platt is perhaps known as the major critic of the Gallagher and Robinson article, The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations (1968: p.8) sought the reversal of the the Gallagher article arguing that the theory was not compatible with what was actually going on in Britain at the time, Platt was convinced of the effect that laissez faire had on British policy. Platt’s concern was also to the extent of the relationship between policy and economics.

Uzoigwe (1978: p.102-107) applied the thesis on a what could have prompted European nations to participate in the Scramble for Africa, he noted that theory tends to imply a fixation of 1882 as the year in which the Scramble for Africa began with British occupation of Egypt yet for France it had begun earlier in 1848 with their imperial activities in Senegambia, Belgian imperialism had begun in 1871 with King Leopold sending Henry Morton Stanley to the Congo Basin to sign imperial treaties with Chief Makoko of the Bateke country. The fact that different European powers claimed ownership of the Congo basin from treaties signed at different times is a clear testimony that colonialism had not started in 1882. The Gallagher article can be best critic and understood in historical events that led to the convening of the Berlin Conference in 1882. A brief history shall be provided, Boahen (1990: p16-43) traces the events that took place in both Europe and Africa noting that in 1869 both Britain and France had invested in the company that was to construct the Suez canal which was completed in 1879, the two countries had entered a gentleman’s agreement that the occupation of Egypt was therefore to be a joint venture operation. It was in 1881 that an internal revolt took place in Egypt led by General Urabi Pasha pitted against the presence of the British and French nationals on Egyptian soil. Britain invited France to help thwart the revolt but France was pre-occupied with its occupation of Tunis and Britain acted alone in Egypt thereafter  crushing the revolt declared Egypt a British protectorate thus breaking the genetleman’s agreement with France. France with the support of the British went on to claim ownership of the Congo basin producing the Brazza-Makoko Treaty signed between Brazza representing the French while Chief Makoko represented the Bateke. The French proclamnation to the ownership of the Congo Basin sparked an outburst with other European nations that had signed similar imperialist treaties in Congo. These events led to the convening of the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 which came up with a code of conduct regulating colonial expansion removing secrecy and it was at this conference that the term ‘sphere of influence’ came to be widely used. Boahen notes that the outcome of the Berlin conference was a code of conduct to regulate imperial expansion and avoid colonial war that hung loose over the Congo Basin, the thus notes ‘ this was the doctrine of effective occupation that was to make the conquest of Africa such a murderous business.’

At this juncture it is imperative to note that claims over the non economic significance of the new colonies disintegrate as one considers the geographic location of the Congo Basin which simply linked the interior states and could be said was a convenient avenue that offered routes to connecting interior Africans colonies, GN Uzoigwe (1978: p.106) notes that the Basin was to be used for mineral extraction hence the clause that declared the Basin a free for all European colonialists. Certainly a colonial war could not have been possible over claims of mass proselytisation. As indicated before there seems to be no clear outline that shows a disjuncture in material or religious conditions that could have necessitated a war amongst European nations whose main aim was to achieve the civilisation of ‘barbaric savages.’ It remains largely doubtful that Europe could have gone to war over the Congo Basin for its ‘sole civilising’ missions. The term that was coined at the Berlin Conference ‘sphere of influence’ cannot be convincingly applicable to non economic explanations of imperialism.

By the same token the claim by orthodox that the Berlin Conference started the Scramble for Africa is folly with Uzoigwe aptly arguing that “the Berlin Conference did not start the Scramble for Africa, it simply laid down rules and procedures to regulate a process that was already in motion.’ Walter Rodney (1971: p.9) also shows that after the Berlin Conference the exploitation of African by Europe became a legalised formality showing statistical volumes of raw materials that were shipped to the metropolitan.

In summation the paper has interrogated conventional theories of imperialism while showing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each school of thought. The argument of the non economic value of colonies has been put to test noting that it was largely shaped and coined within the Eurocentric view of colonial empires as in dire need of civilising of the ‘other’ by the already ‘civilised’ Europe. Despite Hobson having attempted to show the economic driving force of imperialism his argument fell short of the realization that imperialism was equa;lly driven by the need for raw materials an argument that has been substantiated by in the paper by exploring colonial administration trends. While the Gallagher and Robinson thesis provided an alternative viewpoint to British imperial expansion and its motives it too fails to consider the dynamics of European expansion at a continental level and its supposed strategic reasons for imperial expansion in Africa are not in sync with Cecil John Rhodes’ dream of painting the whole of Africa British red who was a leading British agent of colonialism at the time. The construction of railway line in the interior in the early years of colonialism can be best understood as Polanyi argued was meant to facilitate the easy transport of raw materials from inlands to coastal areas that took the raw materials to European industries in the metropolitan. The paper has also shown that while human sacrifices were a traditional feature in some western African states such as the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kittara it would be unrealistic to view the mass European exodus of the 19th Century as being driven by civilising missions as no religious conditions had significantly changed in the eyes of Europe since its first contacts with the continent and the Portuguese had been resident on the African continent ever since the beginnings of mercantilism.